US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01476.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH01476}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 21B  Command Decentralization}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{saipan
admiral
japanese
landing
troops
assault
beaches
lst's
attack
june}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 21B  Command Decentralization

     In the Saipan landings, Vice Admiral Turner took one more step away from
the immediate control of all the details of the assault landing operations.
At Kwajalein the actual landing of the Landing Force with its ten times a
thousand details had been turned over to the Commander Transports.  At Saipan
there was an even greater divesture of detailed duty, with Rear Admiral Hill,
the Second-in-Command, taking over a very large share of the duties of the
Attack Force Commander.

     Admiral Turner described the arrangement as follows:

Although I had command of the entire Joint Expeditionary Force, I also
exercised command of the Northern Attack Force, for the capture of Saipan.
But I divided these duties, assigning to Admiral Hill all naval duties
concerned with the landing of troops, and retaining in my own hands the
gunfire and air control, all protective measures at the objective, and SOPA
duties at Saipan.  But for the Tinian attack, we formed a new Attack Force
under Admiral Hill, and he exercised all naval duties for Tinian.  However, I
retained the SOPA and protective duties at Saipan.

     That this arrangement worked out to Vice Admiral Turner's satisfaction is
indicated in the following extract from a personal letter written to an old
subordinate and friend (Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson) two days before all
organized resistance ceased on Tinian:

I found here that I had my hands full running the SOPA job and the gunfire and
aircraft, while Hill was fully engaged in landing and supplying the troops.

     Rear Admiral Hill stated in his Forager Report:

This command relationship functioned satisfactorily . . . .  However, gunfire
and close air support are so intimately related to the operations of the
ground troops that it is considered advisable in future operations to vest in
the naval commander responsible for the landing, the complete control of naval
gunfire and close air support.

     No sale of this suggestion was made.

     Vice Admiral Turner issued his Attack Order A11-44 for the Northern
Attack Force on 21 May 1944.  Its size and complexity tended to dwarf previous
assault orders.  It ran to 341 pages, which added to the 41 pages of CINCPAC's
order, the 163 pages of Commander Fifth Fleet's order, and the 254 pages of
Commander Joint Expeditionary Force's order, provided 800 pages of reading
matter plus dozens of chart diagrams for the amphibians to peruse.

     In organizing the Northern Attack Force, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill was
designated in the orders as Second-in-Command and assigned to command the
Western Landing Group.  Commodore Theiss, the Chief of Staff and the most
amphibiously seasoned senior officer in the command, other than Vice Admiral
Turner, was designated Commander Control Group, in an effort to avoid a
recurrence of the boat control problems which had plagued the Northern Attack
Force at Roi-Namur.

     A Demonstration Group of nine transports and four cargo ships was
organized from ships carrying the Division Reserves.

     A good many of the amphibians who had carried through in the Marshalls
were available, and a few amphibians, such as Captain Herbert B. Knowles,
Captain Donald W. Loomis and Captain Henry C. Flanagan, dated back to the
Gilberts, or New Georgia and even to Guadalcanal.  However, the Bureau of
Naval Personnel was sweeping most of the veterans ashore, and one had to fight
the Bureau real long and hard to stay at sea and fight the war.

Scheme of Maneuver

     The Scheme of Maneuver for Forager called for landing first on Saipan on
15 June 1944 with two divisions of troops, the Second and Fourth Marines.
They were to land abreast over the western reef on beaches adjacent to the
sugar refinery village of Charan Kanoa and on both sides of Afetna Point.
They were to strike across the island, expanding the attack to the south, and
overrun Aslito airfield in the southern part of the island.

     A major innovation was that early on 15 June the transports carrying the
Division Reserve were to make a feint of landing troops at beaches north of
Tanapag Harbor, and about four miles to the north of the actual landing
berches at Charan Kanoa, in the hope of deceiving the Japanese regarding the
primary point of attack and thus to immobilize temporarily their reserves
believed to be in the area around Tanapag Harbor.  The transports of the
Demonstration Group were ordered to lower their landing craft from the davit
heads, to simulate debarkation of troops and to make smoke and maneuver as
necessary.  The transports were to remain outside of the effective range of
enemy shore batteries but the largely empty landing craft were to make a run
into within 6,000 yards of the beach.

     After the capture of Saipan had been completed, the troops who had
accomplished this task were to be reorganized and then capture Tinian.  The
landing places on Tinian and the exact units to conduct the assault were to be
determined later, but it was hoped to land about 5 July 1944.

     The landing on Guam tentatively, and hopefully, set for 18 June, was to
be accomplished by two simultaneous assault landings.  The Third Marine
Division was to land over the reef at Asan Village west of Agana.  The 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade was to land over the reef in Agat Bay south of
Orote Peninsula.

     The Marines were to hold on the left and expand to the front and right.
The 1st Provisional Marines were to hold on the right and expand to the left,
capture Orote Peninsula and then join up with the Third Marines.

     After the Third Marines and the 1st Provisional Brigade had joined
forces, the Scheme of Maneuver called for holding on the south and moving east
across Guam to cut the Japanese defense forces in two.

     Due to the long, long delay before the assault on Guam could be launched;
there was time to bring the 77th Infantry Division from General Reserve in
Hawaii to the combat zone.  The modified Scheme of Maneuver for Guam,
developed after it was known that the 77th would be immediately available for
the assault landing, called for one regiment of the 77th Infantry to be the
Brigade Reserve, and the other two regiments to be the Corps Reserve, and for
both to prepare for landings at Agat.

     Commodore L. F. Reifsnider, who had fought through the Guadalcanal and
New Georgia campaigns, was designated the Second-in-Command to Rear Admiral
Conolly (CTF-53), who had the assault chore at Guam.  Well before the landing
operation was underway, the Commodore received his promotion to Rear Admiral.

     Alternate plans were drawn up by the Northern Attack Force for landing at
Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, in case surf or other conditions were not suitable for
landing at Charan-Kanoa.

     Arrangements were also made to transfer the troops making up the early
assault waves at Saipan to LST's at Eniwetok, so that these troops would not
have to undergo a time consuming transfer period off the landing beaches, and
they would not have to exist in vastly overcrowded LST's for more than four or
five days.  Similar arrangements using further away Kwajalein as a staging
point were made for assault forces against Guam.

     The gunfire support ships and the jeep support carriers were divided
about equally between the two attack forces, with the Guam contingent directed
to assist in the Saipan attack with limited ammunition and bomb expenditures.
The Saipan gun and air support contingents were due to repay the favor later,
having been resupplied by mobile logistic support forces in the meantime.

     The Southern Attack Force was to arrive about 80 miles east of Guam at
1700 June 16th, so as to be able to initiate minesweeping, underwater
demolition, and last minute photo reconnaissance should it be practicable to
carry out the June 18th assault.

Rehearsals

     Rehearsal of the Northern Attack Force was held 15-19 May 1944 at Maalaea
Bay, Maui and at Kahoolawe Island in Hawaiian Waters.  This rehearsal was the
biggest and longest held to date in the Pacific campaigns.  Several mishaps
during the rehearsal and post-rehearsal period left their mark on the
amphibious forces.

     On the suggestion of Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, each of three LCT's was
equipped as a gunboat with six 4.2-inch Coast Guard mortars and 2,500 rounds
of projectiles.  These were desired primarily to protect the left flank of our
Landing Force against Japanese reserves moving down the coastal road from
Garapan.  By having the LCT's steam parallel to the beaches, they would also
be able to cover the landing beaches with a blanket of heavy mortar fire while
the assault waves were being formed.

     During heavy weather enroute to the rehearsal area the night of 14-15
May, two of the three specially equipped LCT's carried away their securing
gear from the LST's on which they were mounted and riding and slid into Davy
Jones Locker with considerable loss of life.

     The first day rehearsal was further marred by the non-arrival of one LST
Group due to the very rough weather.  The Colorado grounded on an uncharted
pinnacle.  All days of the rehearsal were marred by relatively rough water.
All of these and more led Admiral Hill to call the rehearsals "as a whole very
ragged and poorly conducted."  However, a more junior participant thought that

the rehearsal period in the Hawaiian area proved to be immensely beneficial in
providing much needed supervised drill for Commanding Officers of LST's in the
expeditious launch of tractors at the right time and right place.

     In other words, the rehearsal served its essential purpose.

Before Sailing, A Logistic Disaster

     For the Forager Operation, 47 LST's were assigned to the Northern Attack
Force by Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.  After they had participated in
the big rehearsal held between 14 and 20 May, they returned to the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base and were nested in West Loch near the Naval Ammunition Depot
for final preparations before sailing on the campaign.

     At this time there were only six ammunition ships available to the whole
Pacific Ocean Area.  Because of this lack, 16 LST's had been designated to
each carry 750 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber anti-aircraft shells and the powder
for them.  Ten more LST's were designated each to carry 270 4.5-inch rockets,
6,000 rounds of 40-millimeter and 15,000 rounds of 20-millimeter machine gun
ammunition.

     So the nested LST's were tinder box inflammable, since gasoline in drums
covered much of their topsides, not already occupied by vehicles, and they had
much ammunition stowed outside of their magazines.

     Because of the loss of the two of the "LCT gunboats," Vice Admiral Turner
made the decision to abandon this project.  A natural corollary of that
decision was to unload the 4.2 mortar ammunition out of the remaining "LCT
gunboat." The unloading detail was disaster-bound.

     One or more 4.2-inch high explosive mortar shells being off-loaded by
Army personnel into an Army truck on the elevator on the forecastle of the
LST-353 exploded about 1508 on 21 May 1944.  Those who saw the explosion from
close aboard died.  The immediate follow-up explosion was severe enough to
cause a rain of fragments on all eight LST's in the LST nest, and to start
serious gasoline fires on three of these LST's.  A second large explosion at
1511 in the forward part of one of these three LST's rained burning fragments
on nearly all LST's berthed not only in the nest but in the West Loch area.
This led to a further large explosion at 1522 and the rapid burning, wrecking
and loss of six LST's and the three LCT's carried aboard three of the LST's.

     General Hogaboom, during his interview with this scribe, remembered that:

Admiral Turner boarded a tug and personally led the fight to save what could
be saved.  At great personal danger, he personally supervised the operation
until the fires were suppressed.  His drive and energy permitted us to sail
but one day late and we still landed at Saipan on D-Day at H-Hour.

     In a general article about Admiral Turner, his participation in fighting
the inferno of burning and exploding LST's is described in a bit more detail
by Robert Johnson in the Honolulu Sunday Advertiser for 13 September 1959.

He was rough and tough in West Loch the afternoon and evening of May 21, 1944,
in the glare of explosions that might have caused a serious delay in his plans
for the capture of Saipan in June.

At the height of the fire and explosions in West Loch that day, a Navy
boatswain mate, first class, commanding a yard tug encountered the admiral and
included the encounter in his written report later:

I received an order from an Admiral to proceed to T9 (an ammunition depot
dock) and put out the fire there.  Due to the fact that ammunition was
exploding, I backed away.

The Admiral came to me and said:  'Go back in there and stay or I will shoot
you.'  Four or five LST's were at T9, all of which were burning and terrible
explosions were occurring but I carried out my last order, as I had been told.

     Even worse than the loss of the ships and craft was the loss of 163 men
and the injury of 396 others.

     Since the LST's were scheduled to sail on 24 May, it took a bit of doing
to put the various LST task units and troops back together with all the
necessary amtracs and DUKWs and replacement personnel.  Departure of the LST's
took place on 25 May, and the sturdy craft made up the lost day while enroute
to the assault area.

     In reviewing the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which investigated
the disaster, Admiral King gave the back of his hand to both the Army and the
amphibians by stating:

The organization, training and discipline in the LST's involved in this
disaster leave much to be desired.  The lack of proper understanding and
compliance with safety precautions when handling ammunition and gasoline,
particularly in LST 353 where the first explosion occurred, is also noted.  It
is perfectly apparent that this disaster was not an 'Act of God.'

     It might be observed that adequate ammunition ships might have saved the
day.  Two naval historians put this problem in perspective in the following
way:

The need for fleet ammunition in large quantities during the early stages of
the war did not develop and never became a matter of large scale expenditure,
with a corresponding quick replenishment on a gigantic scale, until after we
started the Central Pacific drive.

When the Japanese surrendered, there were 50 ammunition ships under Service
Squadron Ten control.

Further Reorganization Pacific Amphibious Forces

     Late in April, 1944, Vice Admiral Turner recommended that the Amphibious
Force, Third Fleet, be brought to the Central Pacific from the South Pacific,
and that additional Amphibious Groups be established, so that the various
landings being contemplated could be adequately prepared for.

     Enroute to the Marianas, word was received from COMINCH that a
reorganization along these lines was ordered.  Six Amphibious Groups were
established in Amphibious Force, Pacific.

     Group One    Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy (1913)
     Group Two    Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill (1911)
     Group Three  Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly (1914)
     Group Four   Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider (1910)
     Group Five   Rear Admiral G. H. Fort (1912)
     Group Six    Rear Admiral F. B. Royal (1915)

     The Third and the Fifth Amphibious Force, Pacific, were continued under
Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson (1909) and Vice Admiral Turner respectively.
Rear Admiral Wilkinson was promoted on 12 August 1944 to Vice Admiral.  The
Administrative Command, Amphibious Force, Commodore W. B. Phillips (1911), was
continued and the Training Command, Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral R. O. Davis
(1914), was assigned as part of the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.

     This major increase in the number of amphibious groups showed an
acceptance at the highest naval level of the ever increasing number of troops
which would be involved in conquering the stepping stones to Japan.

Loading and Overseas Movement

     Since the Fourth Marine Division was on the island of Maui, the Second
Marine Division on the island of Hawaii, and the 27th Infantry Division on
Oahu, and the ports of Kahului on the north coast of Maui and Hilo on the east
coast of Hawaii were small, the loading of the Northern Attack Force took
inordinately long.

     The Southern Attack Force troops were loaded at the small man-made ports
in Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands in the Southern Solomons.

     Altogether there were 21 separate movement groups in the Joint
Expeditionary Force for the initial phases of the Forager Operation, and 33
altogether by 15 June 1944.  All were operating on a rigidly controlled
schedule.  Some groups replenished at Kwajalein, some at Roi-Namur and others
at Eniwetok.

     The Main Body of the Northern Attack Force took to sea on Decoration Day,
1944, but the lesser amphibians from the Hawaiian area eased out to sea almost
daily during the long period from 25 May until 2 June.  The Southern Attack
Force from almost Down Under sailed between 3 and 6 June 1944.

     At Eniwetok, all the assault troops, elements of the beach parties, wave
guides and other control officers of the Northern Attack Force were shifted
into 32 LST's.  This eliminated any long-winded delays on the day of the
assault landing.  But:

The trip from Pearl to Saipan was marred by more than 70 breakdowns in the
Tractor Groups.

Frequent tactical drills were held including a full rehearsal of the approach
to Saipan.  This exercise proved invaluable.

     Except for a collision subsequent to an emergency turn at night between
the destroyer transport Talbot and the Pennsylvania on 10 June, the bucking of
an adverse current and the usual ration of possible sound contacts of
submarines, passage of both Attack Forces to the objective area was
uneventful.

     And as one Flotilla Commander of LST's bragged:

Both Tractor Groups arrived in their assigned areas in a precise formation,
well closed up, and within one minute of the time they were scheduled to
arrive after the voyage of 3500 miles.

Estimates of Japanese Troop Strength in the Marianas

     In single words, Japanese troop strength in the Marianas was
"underestimated" by our Forces before the campaign, and has been "growing"
since the campaign.

     Some six weeks before the landings, when the basic amphibious plan for
Forager was issued, Vice Admiral Turner (CTF 51) approved an intelligence
estimate therein, which said:

     It is estimated that by the Forager target date, the garrisons will
consist of a total of about 30,000 men, including 7,000 construction
personnel.

     On 31 August 1944, with the three island battles over and won, and the
report stage reached, Commander Expeditionary Troops (Lieutenant General
Smith) estimated that there had been 54,000 Japanese military personnel on the
three islands when CTF 51 commenced the assault.  This figure was sizably
larger than the approximately 2,400 prisoners of war who had been taken and
the 43,000 Japanese who had been reported buried.  By and large those buried
were Japanese military personnel, although not all were combat troops by any
means.

     The Marines in their historical studies of Forager (1950- 1954) estimated
Japanese military personnel in the Marianas on 15 June 1944 to have been 9,200
on Tinian, 18,500 on Guam, and 29,700 on Saipan for a total of 57,400.  The
Army historians some years later (1959) estimated that 58,168 Japanese
military personnel were on the three islands with 31,629 on Saipan, 8,039 on
Tinian and 18,500 on Guam.

     If, since World War II the Japanese have recorded their troop strength in
the Marianas about 15 June 1944, I have missed it.  During the Saipan battle,
two Japanese prisoners of war, one a naval commander and executive officer of
the naval station there, each estimated the combined strength of Japanese Army
and Navy troops" on Saipan as about 20,000.  This could be correct since there
were considerable numbers of air base personnel and construction and
maintenance personnel, including Koreans who might not, in the minds of the
POWs, have been considered "troops."

Saipan Japanese Garrison

     In accordance with the requirements of Admiral Spruance's Operation
Plans, JICPOA provided a weekly estimate of enemy military strength on Saipan.
When TF 51 sailed from Eniwetok, this estimate was 17,600.  Starting with this
figure, the first step along the line in the process of escalating estimates
located in strictly naval records, is a note in Admiral Nimitz's Command
Summary for 17 June (Saipan date) which states that:

20,000 troops were estimated to be on Saipan.

     And again from the same source on 24 June (Saipan date):

Among captured documents are those indicating strength of enemy to be about
23,000.

     Surprisingly enough, as of 1800 on 10 July 1944, the day after Saipan was
"secured," Vice Admiral Turner logged:

Enemy dead buried by our Troops number 11,948.  There are 9006 civilians
interned and 736 prisoners of war.

     However, after Saipan had been declared "secured," it soon became
apparent that there were a large number of "unsecured" Japanese military
personnel on the island.  CTF 51 logged in his War Diary on 2 August 1944:

As a result of intensified "clean up" drive, 147 Japanese soldiers were killed
on Saipan during the past 24 hours.  An average of 50 per day have been killed
on Saipan since that island was secured.

     A few days later, Vice Admiral Turner logged:

Since July 15, 1944, 1748 Japanese soldiers have been killed on Saipan,
158 captured and over 850 civilians interned.

     When the Forager campaign was over and won and the victors were enroute
back to Pearl Harbor, busily writing their reports, both CTF 51 (Vice Admiral
Turner) and CTF 56 (Lieutenant General Smith) showed marked agreement in their
estimates of Japanese military strength on Saipan.

     CTF 56 included a reconstituted "Enemy Order of Battle" in his Forager
Report, indicating there were 26,500 Japanese military personnel on Saipan.
CTF 51 wrote:

From the day of the assault to 15 August approximately 25,144 enemy dead had
been buried and 1,810 prisoners captured.

     On 7 November 1944, with all the reports of subordinate commanders
available to him, with many of the captured Japanese documents translated, and
with the interrogation of all the Japanese prisoners completed, CINCPOA gave a
more modest total in his official report to COMINCH on the Saipan operation.
He stated that:

Actually encountered on Saipan were about 4,000 naval troops and 20,000 army
troops.

     The unknown number of Japanese civilians who were killed while performing
logistical tasks in Japanese troop rear areas as the Japanese Army retreated
northward, and the considerable number of Japanese civilians who committed
suicide in the final days of the battle, both markedly increased the figure of
"enemy dead buried" over the actual number of Japanese "troops,"

     The point of all this is that since the number of assaulting troops
should be three to four times the number of defending troops, the failure of
our intelligence to determine reasonably closely the very healthy number of
Japanese defenders in the Marianas made the task of the Landing Force long,
difficult and costly.

     Including the Floating Reserve, 71,000 troops were in our original
assault force against Saipan.  This was quite an adequate number to overrun
quickly an island defended by only 17,600 then the estimated Japanese troop
strength when TF 51 sailed from Hawaii.  With 24,000 Japanese troops on
Saipan, our assault forces, using the same ratio, should have numbered in the
neighborhood of 100,000.

     As one commentator wrote on 23 June 1944, in a "Daily Running Estimate"
prepared for COMINCH by his staff.

Captured documents indicate that there were about 23,000 enemy troops assigned
to the defense of Saipan, but it is not known whether this number includes
about 7,000 [without equipment] which were recently landed from ships that had
been sunk . . . .  If there were 30,000 enemy combatant troops available on
Saipan, our overall superiority would have been about 2 to 1 which is very
small for this type of operation.

     The delay in conquering Saipan, basically caused by an inadequate number
of assault troops and faulty intelligence upset a lot of people, including
Vice Admiral Turner.

The Gambit

     During the last part of the period when Vice Admiral Turner and his
Expeditionary Force were wending their way from Guadalcanal and from Pearl
towards the Marianas, Task Force 58 was reducing the Japanese aircraft in the
Marianas to gadfly impotence.  The first TF 58 strike on the afternoon of 11
June was particularly effective since it gained control of the air in the
Marianas, the first basic requisite for a successful amphibious operation.

     Japanese sources, after the war ended, reported there were over 500
aircraft based on Guam, Tinian, and Saipan about 1 June 1944.  But by the time
the TF 58 raids had started on 11 June, half of these planes had been ordered
to island-hop to Halmahera off the west end of New Guinea to support the
Japanese counter-offensive to recapture Biak Island 450 miles to the eastward.
As many of the Japanese pilots were recent graduates of the flying schools,
operational losses during this long inter-island hop were high.  Japanese
plane losses during the TF 58 sweeps ran past the 200 mark.  When the TF 58
raids were over, there were comparatively few Japanese aircraft around to
bother Task Force 51 on 15 June 1944, or on the days to follow.

     On 13 June, the fast and big-gunned battleships from Task Force 58
undertook the bombardment of selected targets on Saipan and Tinian.  The
minesweepers swept the offshore areas to the west of Saipan with the following
results:

Reports from minesweepers which had arrived in Saipan Area on June 13th
revealed that surf conditions were favorable.  No mines or underwater
obstructions have been encountered.

     On 14 June, the old battleships of the Expeditionary Force took up the
task of pinpoint bombardment of gun positions, and the Japanese batteries
retaliated in kind, hitting the battleship California and the Braine (DD-630).

     The same day some 300 UDT personnel swam over the beach approach area and
gladly reported that the barrier reef off Charan Kanoa was flat on top and
generally only two to four feet under the surface.  This would permit DUKWs to
cross at many places.  No inshore mines were discovered at this time and no
underwater obstacles were located off the chosen landing beaches.  For quite
obvious reasons, the Japanese chose the beaches between Agingan Point and Cape
Obiam, providing the closest access (from good beaches) to Aslito Airfield, to
be heavily mined with anti-boat and beach mines.

     Saipan marked the first assignment of high speed transports to each
individual Underwater Demolition Team.  Although the practice had been
initiated at Kwajalein, Saipan marked the first foot-by-foot daylight
reconnaissance by frogmen under cover of blanketing fire by fire support ships
against offensive weapons in the beach areas.

The Approach

     As the amphibians approached Saipan-Tinian from the east and then worked
their way around to Saipan's west coast, one LST recorded the scene:

At 2010 sighted glow on horizon (port bow) and this developed to be battle
action on Saipan.  Star shells and other evidence of battle were seen all
night.

The Weather - Dog Day

     According to Vice Admiral Turner's War Diary, the weather was:

Partly cloudy - a few scattered squalls around midday, winds southeasterly 10
to 15 knots.  Light to moderate southeast swells.

The Demonstration Landing

     The Japanese propaganda English language broadcast gave its reaction to
the efforts of Transport Division Ten and Transport Division Thirty off the
beaches north of Tanapag Harbor:

With full knowledge of the enemy's attempt, our garrison forces allowed the
invaders to approach as near as possible to the coast and then opened up a
fierce concentrated fire on the enemy and foiled the attempt.  Thrown into
wild confusion by the accurate Japanese fire, the enemy barges, or what was
left of them, swiftly returned to their mother vessels at about 8:20 a.m.

     Since the transports and their landing craft observed no gunfire from the
beach, the only truth in this description is the hour of 0820 when the rear
elements of the landing craft returned to their transports and were hoisted
aboard.

The Landings on Saipan

     The Saipan assault required a simultaneous landing across a reef 250 to
700 yards wide of two divisions of Marines, landing eight Battalion Landing
Teams abreast on eight landing beaches covering a front of 6,000 yards.  8,000
troops were due to go ashore in amtracs in the first hour.

     This was the largest landing of the Pacific campaign to date and
necessitated the adequate coordination of the Landing Plans of the two Marine
divisions, and an organization which would keep the very large number of
assault craft, and the early logistic support craft, in reasonable step and
balance.

     It was the first Central Pacific landing against a large heavily defended
island and in marked contrast to the assaults against heavily defended coral
strips.

     After the battle was well over, the Commander of the assault troops
wrote:

For the defense of Saipan, the enemy contemplated a series of strong beach
defenses and a system of mobile defenses in depth behind the beach areas
. . . .

The landing beaches in the Charan Kanoa Area used by Blue assault forces
consisted of approximately 6000 yards of sandy beach backed by an alluvial
plain varying from 400 yards to nearly 1 mile in width.  The beaches in this
vicinity were lined almost continuously by fire trenches, some sections of
anti-tank trench, numerous machine gun emplacements and some dual purpose
weapons . . . .  It appears from the almost complete absence of enemy dead
found in the area, that the defenses lining the beach were abandoned by the
enemy on D-Day (or earlier).

     How Hour was initially set for 0830 but was retarded to 0840, due to
delays in transfer of control personnel.

     Transport Group Able landed the Second Marine Division on Red and Green
beaches while Transport Group Baker did the same chore for the Fourth Marine
Division on Blue and Yellow beaches.  The Transport Area for the large
transports was eight to nine miles from the assigned beaches, and about three
miles for the LST's.  The Line of Departure was 4,250 yards from the beach.
Assault waves were landed in amtracs largely from LST's which carried the
first waves of Marines right on board.

     Transport Group Able had priority for the first two hours subsequent to
How Hour on the use of the channel through the reef opposite Beach Blue One.
UDT Seven blasted the outer reef for 200 yards opposite the Yellow beaches to
open up another highly useful channel and on Dog Day plus two a channel to Red
Beach Three was blasted out of the reef by UDT Five.

     The Landing Plans were complicated, as can be judged from the fact that
the Transport Group Able Plan included four pages of diagrams just for forming
up the early waves.

     The barrier reef was so shallow that the guide boats could not cross it.
Accordingly, Commander Landing Force had agreed that the Boat Control Officer
could be instructed:

The reef marks the limit of Navy responsibility for leading in the assault and
succeeding waves; from there on in, the troops are on their own.  Your job is
to get them to the correct part of the reef.

     Since "the correct part of the reef" was unmarked by buoys, this was a
difficult chore and not perfectly performed.

     All the lead waves left the Line of Departure at 0813 for their 4,250
yard run to the beach.  Actual landings on all beaches were minutes late,
ranging from 0843 on Red and Green to 0854 on Blue and Yellow.

     A combination of more active enemy mortar and machine gun fire from the
area of Afetna Point and a current inside the reef lagoon, not detected by the
UDTs, pushed the landing waves directed to land just north of Afetna Point,
where Beach Green Two was located, further northward to Green One.  The boat
control officers had turned back at the reef and the Marine drivers of the
amtracs were on their own while crossing the 600-yard-wide lagoon.  The
drivers on Red, Blue and Yellow beaches made their designated beaches.  The
drivers for Red and Green beaches to the north of Afetna Point all eased to
the north, but only the ones for Beach Green Two failed to land on the correct
beaches.

     One of the problems immediately following the assault landings was that
subsequent boat traffic for five of the eight beaches (Red Two, Red Three,
Green One, Green Two, Blue One) had to be squeezed through one channel in the
outer reef.  A Traffic Control Officer with a bull horn undertook this
difficult task.

     As Commander Transport Division Twenty described the situation in his
Saipan Report:

Unloading across the reef, several hundred yards wide, presented difficulties.
The only channel through the reef led to a fair sized pier which was damaged
by shell fire and could be used only by a few boats at all stages of the tide.
Landing craft could successfully enter through the channel and unload on the
beaches only at high tide.  Consequently, the majority of the unloading the
first day was done by LVT's and DUKWs.  Only high priority supplies were
unloaded.  The limitations imposed by the reef and low tide made it impossible
to unload boats rapidly.

     And as the Commander 23rd Regimental Combat Team said in his Forager
Report:

The time element in landing tanks through the channel was much too long, since
only one LCM could negotiate the pass at a time.